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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

17 June 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

SUBJECT : Vulnerability of the Sandinista Regime to the
Insurgency

1. The following is my outline of the estimate you requested on
Nicaragua:

"Nicaraguan Conflict Assessment"

I. Capabilities of the Contras

B. Feasible military choices under present and realistic future
force levels. Specifically consider the ability of the Contras
to divide Nicaragua, cutting off the eastern portion of the
country from the western by having Pastora's forces move North
and the FDN forces move South.

C. Likelihood of above feasible alternatives will alter the
situation favorably.

D. Potential of Contras for tactical collaboration.

E. Motivational factors.

F. Resource requirements for sustained operations.

H. Long-range prospects.

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II. Capabilities of the Regime to Resist the Contras, Assuming Various Realistic Levels of Cuban/Soviet Support

A. Specifically consider plausibility of the following [redacted]

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[redacted] "Havana is confident that the anti-Sandinistas can be defeated in a month-long military campaign. The Cubans believe it is in their interest to have the fighting last longer and wear down the anti-Sandinistas gradually. After two or three months a major operations will be launched to destroy the counter-revolutionaries. At the same time, Cuba will seek international support for Managua and characterize Nicaragua as a victim of US military aggression." Could the Contras survive this kind of attack, how would they handle it and what impact would it have on their value?

III. Estimate of Likely Cuban/Soviet Role

IV. Relation of Economic Vulnerabilities to the Insurgency

V. [redacted]


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3. I plan the following schedule, which seems both feasible and responsive to your desire for urgency:

- Separate component drafts completed 23 June, Thursday.
- Melding completed and meeting held of "pertinent" officers 24 June, Friday (including appropriate military, IG, DDO, DDI, NIC officers); estimate then sent to NFIB principals.
- 29 June considered at NFIB.

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Charles E. Waterman

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SUBJECT: Vulnerability of the Sandinista Regime to the Insurgency (NIC #4473-83)

VC/NIC:Waterman:lm (17 June 83)

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